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DONALD H. REGAN

PERCEIVING IMPERCEPTIBLE HARMS (WITH
OTHER THOUGHTS ON TRANSITIVITY,
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS, AND·-CONSEQUENTIALISM)
Many writers believe there can be cases which satisfy the following description:
starting from an initial state of affairs, it is possible to make a series of changes,
none of which alters the value of the state of affairs in any way, but such that the
final state of affairs that results from the series of changes is worse than the
initial state of affairs. 1 I shall call the claim that there can be such cases the "ex
nihilo" claim, since in a sense it asserts that the bad effects of the complete
series of changes arise ex nihilo. Proponents of the ex nihilo claim - ex
nihilists, as I shall call them - usually advance the claim as part of an argument
against act-utilitarianism.2 If there were cases such as the ex nihilist imagines,
then it would be possible to construct variants in which act-utilitarianism
unequivocally required behavior which in the aggregate produced sub-optimal
consequences. We could construct the sort of case I have called (while denying
its possibility) an "act-utilitarian prisoners' dilemma". 3 Act-utilitarianism would
be, in Derek Parfit's phrase, "directly collectively self-defeating".4
Or so the ex nihilist thinks, and so I carelessly thought when I wrote
Utilitarianism and Co-operation. But Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz has pointed out
that the ex nihilist's case would not in fact be an act-utilitarian prisoners'
dilemma. 5 The reason is easiest to see if we have an example. According to the
ex nihilist view of the lawn-crossing problem, there are no bad consequences
from one person's crossing a lawn, regardless of how many others do so. So, if
each walker gains some small benefit from crossing, it is better than one person
cross than none, better that two people cross than one, and so on, right up to its
being better that 1,000 cross than 999. But, it is supposed, the consequences of
1,000 crossing are worse than if none cross, which is to say, it is better that none
cross than 1,000. But now we have a cycle. 1,000 crossings is better than 999,
which is better than 998, ... , which is better than 1, which is better than 0,
which is better than 1,000. If this is all true, "better than" is intransitive, and as
Rabinowicz and Michael Otsuka6 have pointed out, it becomes impossible to say
that any pattern of behavior is either optimal or sub-optimal. So universal
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satisfaction of act-utilitarianism in such a case cannot entail sub-optimal results.
There is no act-utilitarian prisoners' dilemma.
I overlooked this point in Utilitarianism and Co-operation because I
was intent on showing that there simply cannot be such a case as the ex nihilist
imagines - which I still think is true and important to establish. If the ex
nihilist's case did exist, the intransitivity of "better than" would destroy
consequentialist reasoning as we know it. It would be small solace that actutilitarian prisoners' dilemmas disappeared in the wreckage. I shall revisit my
earlier argument against the ex nihilo claim, and elaborate on it slightly, in
section II below. I shall point out that the main premise of the argument is
effectively equivalent to the denial of intransitivity, which is not surprising in
view of what we have just seen. This means that I must confront Larry Temkin's
very impressive "continuum argument" for intransitivity. 7
But I want to begin by focusing on a sort of case in which the ex nihilo
claim has its greatest plausibility- cases in which the harm lies in the worsening
of the subjective experience of some agent or agents. In such cases the ex
nihilist can try to exploit the possibility of imperceptible differences.
1.

INDISCRIMINABLE DIFFERNCES

Consider a standard example. Jones is wearing a wristwatch-like
device, capable of delivering finely graded electric shocks. At the setting 0
there is no current. At each higher setting, the current is increased by a very
small amount over the previous setting. We now perform the following
experiment (with Jones's eager participation - he's a philosopher himself, and
curious). First, we set the dial of the device at I and ask Jones what it feels like.
He says, "Not much. Maybe I can feel a little something, I'm not even sure. But
it's not uncomfortable, definitely not painful in any way. Just something,
maybe." Next, we move the dial to 2 and ask Jones ifhe can feel any difference.
To which he responds, "Nope. No change. I don't feel anything different at all."
Next, we move the dial to 3 and ask Jones if that feels any different from the
way it felt at 2. Again, he says, "No, no difference that I can feel. It feels the
same." Now, we move the dial from 3 back to I and ask if that makes any
difference. At that point, Jones says, "Yeah, as a matter of fact, it does. I
wouldn't have expected it to, given my previous responses, but it does, and now
I realize that 3 was actually a bit uncomfortable. Not bad, or I would have felt
the difference sooner. But there was a tiny bit of discomfort at 3 - just an
almost unnoticeably slight pain, but still, something that I would prefer not to
have continued indefinitely." So far so good. This is an instance of the
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intransitivity of "indiscriminably different". 2 is indiscriminably different from
I; and 3 is indiscriminably different from 2; but 3 is discriminably different
from 1.
At this point it is very tempting to reason as follows: (a) the badness of
pain is entirely a matter of how things feel; (b) Jones cannot feel any difference
between the way things are at 1 and the way things are at 2; therefore, (c) things
are no worse, in respect of Jones's pain, at 2 than at l. By the same argument,
things are no worse at 3 than at 2. But Jones can feel the difference between 1
and 3, so things are worse at 3 than at l. In sum, two marginal changes that
each make no difference at all to the value of the state of affairs (from l to 2 and
from 2 to 3) combine to make a change (from l to 3) that does make a
difference.
The ex nihilist, of course, embraces this conclusion. For myself, I think
the reasoning, plausible as it sounds, is mistaken. But how, exactly? Some
people who reject ex nihilism are driven by cases such as this to believe in
"imperceptible harms". 8 They claim that the change from I to 2, for example,
harms Jones even though he cannot feel any difference. This is paradoxical. If
the sort of harm we are talking about is entirely a matter of how things feel, how
can a change be harmful that cannot be perceived? My sympathies are much
more with the believers in imperceptible harms than with the ex nihilists. But
the bare assertion that there must be imperceptible harms seems merely to
replace one paradox with another. Also, if we simply assert the existence of
imperceptible harms without any further explanation, it seems that we have no
choice but to assume, as believers in imperceptible harms usually do, that each
step in a sequence such as we have imagined must account for an equal share of
the total harm. But this amounts to assuming, at least for this sort of case, what I
have rejected as the "contributory consequences" approach9 and Parfit as the
"Share-of-the-Total View" . 10 So, can we do better?
Consider a different experiment. We begin by setting the dial to I and
asking Jones what it feels like. He responds exactly as he did above, "Not
much. Maybe I can feel a little something, I'm not even sure. But it's not
uncomfortable, definitely not painful in any way. Just something, maybe."
Next, we move the dial to 3 and we ask him what it feels like there. Notice we
do not ask for a comparison with 1. We just ask, as we asked about I, what it
feels like. His response is again the same in substance (allowing for the
difference in the form of the judgment) as what he has told us before. He says,
"That's a bit uncomfortable. Not bad. But there is a tiny bit of discomfort. It's
an almost unnoticeably slight pain, but it is something that I would prefer not to
have continue indefinitely." Now we move the dial to 2, and once again we ask
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the non-comparative question: we ask what it feels like. At this point, I don't
know or care what Jones says. The important point is simply this: it is not
logically possible that what Jones says about 2 should be both the same as what
he said about 1 and the same as what he said about 3, since what he said about 1
and what he said about 3 are different. Whatever he says about 2, it must either
differ from what he said about I, or differ from what he said about 3, or both.
What do we learn from this experiment? Recall that after our first
experiment, we argued from the premises (a) that the badness of pain is entirely
a matter of how things feel, and (b) that Jones could not feel any difference
between the way things are at I and the way things are at 2, to the conclusion (c)
that things are no worse at 2 than at 1 (and similarly, no worse at 3 than at 2).
But the second experiment casts grave doubt on this inference. Once again, we
may assume that the badness of pain is entirely a matter of how things feel. But
we now have evidence either that 2 feels different from I or that 2 feels different
from 3. And we have this evidence from exactly the same privileged source as
the evidence in our first experiment, Jones himself. With regard to at least one
of these pairs, Jones's reports of how the conditions feel are not the same. For
convenience, let us assume that there is a difference between Jones's description
of how 2 feels and his description of how 3 feels. (Obviously, the argument
would proceed the same if the difference were between I and 2.) We now seem
to have evidence both that 2 and 3 feel the same (since Jones felt no difference
in the first experiment) and that 3 feels worse than 2 (from his descriptions in
the second experiment).
What should we think, given this conflicting evidence? The first
question, of course, is just how serious the "conflict" is anyway? In most
contexts, we would see no genuinely problematic conflict between (reliable)
evidence that Jones could not distinguish perceptually between two situations
and other (reliable) evidence that there was a significant difference nonetheless.
We would conclude without hesitation that there was a difference, which Jones
was unable to perceive. This would acc0unt easily and naturally for all the
evidence. But if we attempt that move in this context, we are brought up against
the question how there can be any difference between two situations in respect
of a predicate grounded in Jones's feeling, if Jones cannot feel any difference
between them. Of course, this "if Jones cannot feel any difference between
them" overstates the case a bit. Asked for a comparative judgment (between 2
and 3), Jones can feel no difference. But asked for separate non-comparative
judgments, he reveals that he does feel 2 and 3 differently nonetheless, at least
when they are presented and inquired about in that way. The real puzzle in this
area is just this incongruity in Jones's reports. How can it be that he feels 2 and
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3 differently if they are presented separately, but that he feels no difference
between them if they are presented side-by-side?
Puzzle it is, but not a logical paradox (like the ex nihilo claim). The
answer to the puzzle will lie in the facts of the neurobiology of pain. I do not
know the true answer; it is possible that no one currently could give a really
complete answer. But just to emphasize that the question here is an empirical
one (and for no other purpose), I shall offer a couple of speculative answers.
One possibility is that when Jones is presented with two very similar stimuli in
succession and asked to compare them, the effect of trying to compare the
present stimulus with the recent remembered one is to muddle them together so
that each appears to be an average between them. 1 and 2 may be close enough
together for this effect to operate, and likewise 2 and 3, but not 1 and 3. Notice
that if this is the explanation of the puzzle, then when Jones says 2 feels the
same as 1, he is reporting on a different internal presentation of2 than when he
says that 2 feels the same as 3. His internal presentation of 2 when asked for a
non-comparative judgment must be different from at least one of these other
internal presentations of 2, so it is no longer surprising that his non-comparative
judgments should reveal differences that are obscured when he makes
comparisons. And it is natural to assert that the non-comparative judgments are
a better guide to the "way things are" - at least when we are dealing with a chain
of comparisons that causes inconsistency in the internal presentations of the
intermediate stimuli. 11
Here is another possibility. It may be that when 1 and 2 are close and 1
is presented first, then the internal presentation of 2 is just assimilated to the
internal presentation of 1; and further that if 3 is close to 2, it is then assimilated
to 2, and thus to 1, in the same way. So it may in fact be that after we have
started with 1, and moved to 2 and evoked a comparative judgment, and then
muved to 3 and evoked another comparative judgment with 2, 3 really does "feel
the same" as 1. But the situation is unstable, like a supercooled liquid. As soon
as we ask about the comparison between 3 and 1, Jones "realizes" that 3 is
enough different from I to feel different, and so now it does - as we may
assume it would have from the start if we had solicited only non-comparative
judgments.
(It might seem that I have just allowed the existence of a case where
two imperceptible changes add up to a perceptible worsening, even though
neither imperceptible change in fact made things worse. We can imagine that
after we moved from 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3, we asked Jones for noncomparative reports as well as comparative, and that he not only said he could
feel no difference but gave identical non-comparative reports as well. And yet,
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there was an overall change. The answer to the puzzle should be obvious. Our
latest version of the experiment actually involves three significant interventions
in Jones's situation: (I) the move from I to 2, (2) the move from 2 to 3, and (3)
asking Jones for a comparative judgment on I and 3. Neither of the first two
"imperceptible" interventions caused any real harm, even as judged by the noncomparative reports; but then, neither did the first two interventions together.
After the first two interventions, Jones's non-comparative reaction to 3 was the
same as his original non-comparative reaction to I. So there was as yet no
harm. It is only the complete chain of three interventions that has produced any
overall harm; and we can see that the third intervention in particular made Jones
worse off, even though it did not involve changing the setting on his shockdevice. The third inttrvc11tiun, by some cognitive-perceptual mechanism we do
not and need not understand in detail, changed how 3 felt to Jones. So in fact,
our general claim is vindicated. At exactly the point where some harm appears
from the sequence of interventions, we are able to identify a particular
intervention in the sequence which causes harm at the margin. This example
emphasizes that how a particular condition feels may depend on history and
context - but however it feels, there will be no instance of the ex nihilo claim.)
I have observed that in general, if we are trying to decide whether two
situations are different, we would give more weight to reliable evidence of
difference between them than to equally reliable evidence of Jones's inability to
perceive a difference. And my neurobiological fantasies are meant to suggest
that that is still the sensible strategy here, even though the ultimate question is
about how things "feel" to Jones. We should credit the evidence of difference.
It is important to remem_ber, as I have stressed before, that the evidence for the
proposition that the two stimuli feel different comes from exactly the same
source as the evidence that they feel the same, namely, Jones himself. So, there
is no danger of "undermin[ing] the distinction between the physically objective
and the experientially subjective", which Warren Quinn warns us against in his
defense of the ex nihilo claim. 12
Of course, the strategy of preferring the evidence of difference which
comes from Jones's non-comparative reports over the evidence of sameness
from his comparative reports would not be sensible if it could be argued that the
evidence of the non-comparative reports is suspect. I can imagine someone
arguing, for example, that Jones's report on condition 2 in the second
experimental protocol does not count, because we have somehow "forced" Jones
to respond in a way that will differentiate 2 either from I or from 3. But that is
not true. We haven't forced any response. Jones has been perfectly free at every
point to say exactly what it seems to him appropriate to say. He could have
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given exactly the same description of how things felt in all three conditions, if
that was how they struck him. It is true that once Jones has given differing
reports on I and 3, he cannot report on 2 in a way that will fail to differentiate it
either from 1 or from 3, or both. In that sense, he is forced to differentiate it, if
he continues to respond. But it is the limits of the logically possible that "force"
him. There is no sense in which we are forcing him to invent or to report a
distinction where he feels none. (It is worth remembering that in a sense Jones
is not "reporting a distinction" at all. If he is able to focus his mind exclusively
on each of the non-comparative questions as we ask it, he might in principle be
as surprised as we to find that he has reported differently on stimuli that he
cannot distinguish when they are presented side-by-side and he is_~sked to
compare. But it seems to me that the right reaction, even for Jones himself,
would be to believe that the stimuli do in fact feel different when presented and
attended to separately, even if the difference is imperceptible as such, that is, in
the making of a single comparative judgment.)

It may yet seem that there is something misleading and improperly
compulsive about the questions we put in the second experimental protocol. If it
seems that way, the reason must be that we are troubled by a worry that we are
mistakenly reifying "the way it feels [always to Jones, of course] at I or 2, or
wherever". And yet, we regularly ask and answer questions like "How does it
feel?" or "Does that hurt?" And it is clear that we are asking for and giving
more than a report on how "that" compares to the state just before it, since the
answer may be, "Yes, it hurts. It hurts less than a moment ago, but it still hurts."
It might be suggested that what pass for non-comparative judgments about
whether something hurts are all comparative at a deeper level, because they all
involve comparison of the state in question to some standard "neutral" feeling
state. Even if this is true, comparison to a standard reference point gives us in
effect a one-place predicate; whereas what we have been referring to as
"comparative" judgments involve comparison between two states neither of
which is a standard reference point, and such judgments ineliminably involve a
two-place predicate.
So, on any analysis, what we have called "noncomparative" judgments are different from what we have called "comparative"
judgments, and they are very much a part of our ordinary conceptualization of
the phenomenon of pain.
Not only does our ordinary intuitive understanding presuppose a "way
it feels", but so does all consequentialist reasoning. (And so, as we shall see,
does the ex nihilist's reasoning, even if, like Quinn, he is attacking
consequentialism.) The basic bearers of value for a consequentialist theory are
states of affairs, which include elements like "the way it feels at 2". There is no
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way (either for the consequentialist or for the ex nihilist) to translate the fact that
Jones cannot distinguish between stimulus I and stimulus 2 into any conclusion
about how Jones (or anyone) should act without positing, explicitly or
implicitly, the intermediate proposition that Jones is in fact no worse off with 2
than with l. That is to say, without positing that "how things feel at 2" is no
worse than "how things feel at l ". Ultimately, Jones's inability to distinguish is
relevant only as evidence for the proposition that "how things feel at 2" and
"how things feel at I" are the same. And this should be Jones's view of the
matter too. What he is really concerned about is not whether he can tell the
difference between two settings, but how he fares at each. Whether he can tell
the difference, when they are presented side-by-side and he focuses directly on
the comparative question, is evidence on the issue of whether he fares the same
or differently under each. But it is no more than evidence. It is not a final
answer to the ultimate question. 13 Some writers may have overlooked this
because of a subtle and unconscious confusion about what act-consequentialism
requires us to evaluate. Loosely speaking, whether the act-consequentialist
should move the dial on Jones's device from 2 to 3, say, depends on the value of
the consequences of that change. And the consequences of the change are the
difference between the state of affairs at 3 and the state of affairs at 2. So it
appears that the act-consequentialist propriety of the move depends on the value
of the difference between 3 and 2; and it appears further that we can evaluate
that difference directly by asking Jones to give us a comparative judgment as he
moves from 2 to 3 about whether it feels worse. In most ordinary cases, this
procedure would get us the right answer. But if the situation is one where Jones
reports no difference between 2 and 3 when asked for a comparative judgment
but describes them differently when asked for non-comparative judgments, then
the procedure misleads us. TI1e basic bearers of value for a consequentialist, as I
have said, are states of affairs, and changes in states of affairs are not
themselves states of affairs. So strictly speaking, a change is not something that
has value at all. When we speak of the value of a change, this is an elliptical
way of referring to the difference between the values of the final and initial
states. 'This difference in values is what really matters. So what we are
primarily interested in is not the value of the change from 2 to 3, but rather the
difference between the value of 3 and the value of 2. Which is to say, the
difference between the value of "how it feels at 3" and the value of "how it feels
at 2". And the most direct evidence we have about what each of those states is
like (from our second experiment) suggests that "how it feels at 3" is different
from "how it feels at 2", even though Jones cannot distinguish between them in a
single comparative judging.
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It may seem that I put too much credence in Jones's non-comparative
reports. If we run our second experimental protocol a second time, it is unlikely
that Jones's descriptions of "how it feels" at each setting of the dial will be just
the same as they were the first time. Of course, we can assume that the
descriptions of how it feels at l and how it feels at 3 will still be different, since
the existence of a difference between these is one of the basic features of the
puzzle situation. And that means that in any particular trial, the description of
how it feels at 2 will differ from at least one of the other descriptions, just as we
have said. But the ex nihilist might claim that the variability of Jones's
descriptions casts doubt on whether there really is anything he is describing, and
thus supports the idea that the second protocol has somehow forced Jones into
an illusory discrimination.
111is is not persuasive. Jones's descriptions may vary for a number of
reasons that are fully consistent with there being a determinate "w&y things feel"
at each setting in each experimental trial. The descriptions may vary because
how things feel is actually slightly different in each trial, which could be
because of different detailed history and context, or indeed because of random
neurological events in Jones. The descriptions may also vary because language
is a very imperfect medium for reporting inner events and states. This second
point does reveal that Jones's reports do not give us perfect access to how things
feel to him at each setting in each experiment. But the point of introducing the
second experimental protocol does not depend on our having perfect access
through Jones's reports to the way things feel. Our access is often good enough
so that Jones's reports will allow us to identify genuine differences in the way
things feel, even at "indiscriminable" settings. But the real point of the second
protocol, with its seeming reliance on our having access through Jones's reports
to how things feel, is just to focus our attention on that "how things feel". It is to
remind us that Jones himself can make, and makes, non-comparative judgments
on individual settings as well as judgments about discriminability. As do we all.
We should not be led by the fact that individual experiments are neither
perfectly informative nor perfectly repeatable to doubt the existence of the
underlying phenomena.
Let us now change our focus slightly and consider Warren Quinn's
well-known ex nihilist argument. 14 (As we shall see, Quinn seems to anticipate
something like my argument from the second experimental protocol, and he
responds partly by doubting the determinateness of "the way it feels".) Quinn
imagines Jones wearing a shock-device with a thousand-and-one settings,
numbered 0 to 1,000.
Neighboring settings give currents which are
indiscriminable. The lowest setting is completely painless. The highest is
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torturous. Once a week, Jones is given an opportunity to be paid $10,000 if he
increases the setting on the dial by one. At each choice point Jones is allowed a
brief period of free experimentation with various settings, but at the end of the
period for experimentation, the dial is reset to where it was at the beginning of
the period, and Jones's only choice is to leave it where it is or to advance it.
Except temporarily during the experimentation period, the dial can never be set
back.
Quinn's claim is that if Jones is guided by standard tenets of rationality,
he will have the dial set forward each week. After all, Jones can't feel any
difference between the present setting and the next higher, so he is no worse off
in regard to the pain, and he gets $ I 0,000. This goes on for a thousand weeks,
at the end of which Jones (aside from being twenty years older) has a fortune of
$10,000,000 and is committed to torturous pain for the rest of his life. At this
point, Jones wishes he could give back the $ I 0,000,000 and take off the device.
But it is too late. And in Quinn's view, it is the standard principles of rational
decision-making that have brought disaster on Jones's head. (Actually, if
Quinn's story was the whole story on Jones's preferences, we could not say the
outcome was a disaster. Quinn equips Jones with intransitive preferences,
which makes it impossible to say that any result is globally worse for Jones than
any other; and his attempt to avoid this difficulty seems to me completely
inadequate. But since I think Quinn's story is not the whole story, and since I
a!:,)fee that if Jones keeps moving the dial right up to 1,000 that is a disaster, there
is no need to pause over this.)
As I have mentioned, Quinn anticipates an argument something like
mine. He imagines someone suggesting that we should assign to each setting a
"discomfort-index", quantifying how uncomfortable Jones is at that setting. The
index will start at O at the setting 0, and will be some very high positive number
at 1,000, so there must be some first setting s at which the discomfort-index is
positive. And therefore, whether Jones can feel it or not, his comfort level must
decline in moving from s-1 to s. Quinn responds: "But the measure of [Jones's]
discomfort is indeterminate. 'Inere is no fact of the matter about exactly how
bad he feels at any setting. And if so, we cannot argue that the measure of his
discomfort must increase in some single step." 15
Now, there are a number of possible responses to this, including the
assertion that Quinn mistakenly thinks he sees indeterminacy where there is
really only variability according to context and the limitations of language as a
medium for reporting inner states. But the point I want to make now is that we
can concede Quinn his indeterminacy without conceding his conclusion. If
indeterminacy prevents us from saying that one of two neighboring comfort
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levels is better or worse than the other, which is Quinn's claim, then it must also
prevent us from saying that the two comfort levels are the same. But, as I have
noted previously, what Jones is ultimately concerned about is not his powers of
discrimination, but his comfort level at various settings. And at any point where
it is impossible to say the neighboring comfort levels are the same (which seems
on Quinn's implied view to be every point), Quinn's argument that rationality
requires Jones to advance the setting breaks down. His argument depends on the
premise that if Jones cannot tell the difference (within the protocol) between
neighboring settings, then they have the same comfort level, so the $10,000 for
advancing the setting can be secured at no (local) cost. But this premise is now
unavailable.
We can see essentially the same point in the context of another of
Quinn's objections-and-refutations. The objection is given thus:-"[Jones] feels
no worse at 1 than at 0, and the comfort-comparison between I and Ois the same
for him as the comparison between 2 and 0. [This Quinn claims to have
established previously.] From this it seems to follow that he feels no worse at 2
than at 0. Reiterated enough, the argument implies that he feels no worse at
1,000 than at 0. Here we find a kind of sorites puzzle. Some of his clear and
immediate judgments about his comparative comfort are true only if others are
false." 16 Quinn attempts to refute this charge of inconsistency in his method by
making two observations. First, he notes truly that his argument does not
require Jones to actually rely on the empirically false conclusion of a sorites
argument. (Jones never bases any reasoning on the premise that he feels no
worse at 1,000 than at 0.) And he continues, "What naturally matters to [Jones]
is that the comfort status of s and s+ 1 are, introspectively and behaviorally, no
different . . . . It is enough for him that the empirical data give him no reason to
suppose that his comfort declines, either directly or relative to some fixed point,
in any single step." 17 This second point is either wrong or too weak to carry
Quinn's conclusion.
Consider. There is going to be some point long before the dial is set to
1,000 at which Jones realizes that the current going into his wrist hurts. (That
there will be some such point, Quinn agrees. He insists we cannot identify a
first such point, but, right or wrong, that does not matter.) Now, at any points*
where he realizes that the current hurts, a rational Jones will also realize that
something is wrong with the reasoning Quinn recommends. As we have seen,
Quinn's reasoning tells Jones that he feels no worse at any s than at 0. But Jones
can now observe empirically that that is false. He has arrived at ans* where he
feels worse than at 0. So something is wrong with the reasoning. And it is clear
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in a general way what is wrong. Somehow the judgments of indiscemibility,
however confidently made and even correct, do not tell Jones all he needs to
know. There is more to the facts about how things feel than those judgments
encompass.
When Quinn says "the empirical data give [Jones] no reason to suppose
that his comfort declines ... in any single step," he apparently means to insist
that the judgments of indiscemibility are still enough to require Jones to move
along one step at a time. But that is surely mistaken. Given the complete
ensemble of empirical data, which includes the fact that s* hurts, Jones has
reason to think that either (a) his comfort level has declined, unnoticed, at some
step, in which case it could happen again, or (b) he doesn't have any idea what is
going on, in which case he has no business regarding any particular choice as
"rationally required". Quinn would in effect have Jones believe that he
understands perfectly what is going on at each individual step, even though he
cannot figure out how the steps combine to produce a result that is inconsistent
with what logic, plus his understanding of the individual steps, demands. This is
not reasonable. Quinn might object that I still have not said what precisely Jones
ought to do. Tiiat is true. On my view, there are facts about how things feel at
different settings that Jones may not have adequate access to in the situation
Quinn describes. That is a problem for Jones; but how he should proceed is not
my present concern. My present concern is just to point out that when Jones
realizes the comparative judgments of indiscemibility are not telling the whole
story, he will see that he is not rationally required to keep advancing the dial.
Whatever Jones should d_o at this point, Quinn's story breaks down.
A final remark on Quinn, just for its heuristic value. As Quinn
imagines the case, Jones gets $10,000 each time he advances the setting on his
shock-device. But notice that if Quinn's argument were sound, it would work
exactly the same if Jones got only $10 for each advance. That alteration,
however, would make the argwnent seem vastly less compelling. So the
argwnent does not work as advertised. Which leaves us with no reason to think
it works at all.
Let us pause to take stock. My main object in this first section has been
to suggest that cases involving indiscriminable differences look very different,
and cease to offer any special threat to act-consequentialism (in moral reasoning
or in prudential), if we redirect our attention from the subject's judgments of
indiscemibility to his judgments of individual states of affairs. In a sense our
second experimental protocol vindicated "imperceptible harms", but only by
showing that they are not really imperceptible after all. And nothing about the
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argument suggested either that every physical change in a sequence such as we
imagined must occasion imperceptible harm, or that the hann must be evenly
spread over the discrete changes.
Throughout this section I have been arguing against the ex nihilo claim,
but it may seem that the precise form of my opposition changed between the
discussion of our original experiments and the discussion of Quinn's scenario.
In fact, it did. The ex nihilo claim says that there can be cases such that, starting
from an initial state of affairs, it is possible to make a series of changes, none of
which alters the value of the state of affairs in any way, but such that the final
state of affairs that results from the series of changes is worse than the initial
state of affairs. The denial of this claim has a somewhat different purport
depending on whether each state of affairs has a determinate value. If each state
of affairs does have a detenninate value, then the negation of the ex nihilo claim
entails that whenever a series of changes results in a final state which is worse
than the initial state, there must be at least one particular change which has made
things worse. If it is not the case that each state of affairs has a determinate
value, then the negation of the ex nihilo claim says only that if a series of
changes results in a final state which is worse than the initial state, then it cannot
be that every individual change has determinately left the value of the state of
affairs unchanged. (Even this, as we saw in the discussion of Quinn, is enough
to block the ex nihilist's argument against act-consequentialism.) For myself, I
am inclined to think that each state of affairs has a determinate value (more on
that in the next section), but it is certainly worth having both versions of the
negation of the ex nihilo claim in play.
2.

THE PROBLEMS FOR CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES

Let us now consider from a more general perspective what all this means
for consequentialist theories.
First, let me state the most general version of the
claim that we have been tending towards in section I:
(S) If we move from one state of affairs to another by a series of
intermediate changes, then the difference between the value of the final
state of affairs and the value of the initial state of affairs is equal to the sum
of the marginal differences made by each intermediate change along the
way.
I shall call this the "summation" principle. It presupposes that we can associate with
each state of affairs a real number which represents its value (a presupposition I shall
consider further in a moment). But given that presupposition, it is a simple truth of
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arithmetic. 18 Let us call the various states of affairs l through N. 'Ibe value of state
of affairs i we call Vi. The difference in value brought about by any particular
change from state i to state i+ 1 is Vi+! - Vi. So, what (S) says is that
VN- V1 = (V2 -Vi)+ (V3 -V2) + · · · + (Vi+! -Vi)+···+ (VN-1 - VN.2)+
(VN-VN-1)This, as I say, is a truth of arithmetic.
If instead of focusing on marginal and total changes to overall value
(benefit net of harm) over the series of changes, we focused either on marginal and
total benefit over the series of changes or on marginal and total harm (assuming
benefit and harm are separately identifiable), it is obvious that analogues to (S)
would also be true. In addition, the summation principle (S) entails the following
"intermediate change" principle (I), which is a more limited generalization of the
conclusion from section I:
(I) If we move from one state of affairs to another by a series of changes;
and if the value of the fmal state of affairs is different from/greater than/less
than the value of the initial state of affairs; then it must be the case that at
least one of the intermediate changes alters/increases/decreases the value of
the state of affairs.
This "intermediate change" principle is what most directly prevents the existence of
act-utilitarian prisoners' dilemmas such as the ex nihilist imagines. It tells us that
whenever a series of changes makes things worse, then some particular change along
the way must make things worse, and thus cannot be required by act-utilitarianism.
Now, what about the presupposition that we can associate with each state a
real number which represents its value? Some possible difficulties are easily dealt
with. We have noted that th~ value of the state of affairs produced by a particular
stimulus or resulting from a specified change may vary with context or history. We
can either think of this as one incompletely specified state of affairs having different
values depending on context or history, or we can think of it as the same intervention
bringing about different completely specified states of affairs, each with a different
value, depending on context or history. How we think of it does not matter, provided
we remember what we are doing. In either event, the number representing the value
of the state of affairs brought about by a particular intervention will need to vary
with context or history. But provided the valuations of various states are made under
consistent assumptions about context and history, (S) will be satisfied.
Similarly, to claim that (completely specified) states of affairs have
determinate values is not to claim that we always know precisely what they are. We
may be ignorant of precisely what state of affairs an intervention produces in
particular circumstances, or we may be ignorant of just what value the state of affairs
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possesses. In such cases it may be that all we really have is a probability distribution
(over the possible states of affairs, or over the possible values, or, if there is
uncertainty about both, over the combination). But even this will allow us to assign
an expected value to the result of each intervention, and once again, satisfaction of
(S) by these expected values is guaranteed by arithmetic.
In conversations about the intransitivity of indiscriminability I have
encountered the suggestion (not in print so far as I know) that intransitivity is best
accounted for by thinking of the values of states of affairs not as real numbers, but as
some sort of fuzzy numbers - blurs, as it were, on the real line. Two states that
correspond to overlapping blurs are indiscriminable, but if one blur is entirely to the
right (left) of the other, then the state corresponding to the first blur is better (worse)
than the state corresponding to the second. It is difficult to know how to respond to
such a suggestion in the absence of more detail about how the blurs
supposed to
work. And yet, the idea is not transparently silly. It even has a sort of appeal, since
it does sometimes seem a heroic assumption to suppose that every bearer of ultimate
value has a value that is completely definite. This is no doubt why Quinn felt free to
assert without argument that Jones's comfort levels were indeterminate. So --:- it
seems worth mentioning the "blur" possibility, even if I need someone else to
develop it before I can deal with it properly.
This much I can say. The blurs have to be individuated somehow if it is to
be possible for any two states to have distinguishable values. The blurs must
therefore have properties beyond their blurriness. The two most obvious ways to
think of the blurs are (a) as bounded intervals on the real line or (b) as some sort of
density functions over the real line. If the blurs are bounded intervals, they will have
left endpoints (greatest lower bounds) and right endpoints (least upper bounds) and
midpoints between their endpoints. Similarly, if the blurs are density functions, they
will have something like means and medians, and so on. With regard to any of these
numbers that help to define the blur, the analogue of (S) will be satisfied by those
numbers. So we are not as far from the world of determinate values as it may seem.
Additionally, the blur idea may not be as intuitively satisfactory as it seems
at first. The idea is appealing because it relieves us of the claim that every bearer of
ultimate value has a perfectly definite value. And it also seems at first to give a nice
representation of the intransitivity of indiscriminability, since "overlaps" is an
intransitive relation on blurs. But it is not clear that this model of intransitivity
actually captures intuitively the real-world phenomena. We have observed that blurs
must have some properties other than their blurriness; and Jones might be able to
discriminate on the basis of those other properties between some blurs that overlap.
If, in our original experiment, the pain at 1 and the pain at 2 are represented by blurs
which overlap just a little bit at the right end of the I-blur and the left end of the 2-
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blur, would not Jones regard these as different? More particularly, would it not be
irrational of Jones to regard them as interchangeable in every choice situation? To
avoid this objection, the blur-theorist might say that Jones does not himself perceive
the blurs; rather they represent somehow the range of possibilities for what he may
perceive. But then what does he perceive, and what reason have we at all for
thinking that overlappingness of blurs corresponds to Jones's inability to perceive
any difference? (Note that we cannot say the pains are indiscriminable only if the
blurs are identical, or have the same endpoints, because then indiscriminability
would be transitive.) Enough about blurs.
To my mind, the most powerful attack on the idea that every state of affairs
has a determinate value does not involve indiscriminability, or indeterminacy on the
model of blurriness, at all. I refer to Larry Temkin's "continuum argument for
intransitivity", 19 which I $hall summarize in a moment. The conclusion Temkin
purports to establish is that "all things considered better than", the fundamental
concept for moral evaluation of states of affairs, is intransitive. Now, if every state
of affairs has a determinate value which can be represented by a real number (and if,
just to be explicit, the "better than" relation is modeled by "greater than" on the real
numbers - as we have naturally assumed all along), then "better than" is transitive,
just because "greater than" (on the real numbers) is transitive. So, conversely, if
"better than" is not transitive, it cannot be the case that every state of affairs has a
determinate value representable by a real number. Of course, for those of us who
have a strong intuition that states of affairs do have values representable by real
numbers, that amounts to a strong intuition against Temkin's conclusion. But
Temkin recognizes that for many people his denial of transitivity is "wildly
counterintuitive". 20 And the intuition that states have real-number values is not an
additional intuition against Temkin, since that intuition and the intuition that "better
than" is transitive are on reflection pretty much the same.
·
So, what is Temkin's argument? It rests on three claims. First, Temkin
claims that for any experience of pain, of whatever intensity and duration, another
experience which involves a slightly less intense pain lasting twice as long is worse.
Second, he claims that the possible intensities of painful experiences form a
continuum from the pain of excruciating torture at one end to something like the
slight discomfort ofa hangnail at the other. Third, he claims that however long one's
life (and this may include lives of millions of years), suffering the slight discomfort
of a hangnail for one's entire life would be better than suffering two years of
excruciating torture somewhere in that life.
These three claims are enough to generate a sequence of possible lives on
which "better than" is intransitive. Begin with a (very long) life, call it A, that
includes two years of excruciating torture. By Temkin's first assumption, A is better
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than B, a life of the same length that includes four years of a pain, perhaps still
torturous, that is slightly less intense. B, in turn, is better than C, which includes
eight years ofa pain slightly less intense than the pain in B. We proceed downwards
along the continuum of painfulness guaranteed by Temkin's second assumption, at
each step reducing the pain slightly but doubling its duration, until we have got to a
life Y in which the pain of a hangnail is continued for however many years our
process of repeated doubling has now got us to. Since A is better than B, and B is
better than C, and so on right down to Xis better than Y, we can see that if "better
than" were transitive, A would be better than Y. But, by Temkin's third assumption,
Y is better than A. So "better than" is not transitive.
I am not persuaded. It's not that I have a crushing counterargument. My
not being persuaded results mainly from a very strong reluctance to be persuaded. I
share the view Temkin attributes to Derek Parfit, that if"better than'~-is not transitive,
practical reasoning is seriously endangered, perhaps destroyed. But if I haven't got a
counterargument, I can at least point out a specific ground for unease with Temkin's
argument. My first reaction to the argument was to be uncomfortable with Temkin's
first assumption - that given any painful experience, of whatever intensity and
duration, another painful experience involving a slightly lesser pain lasting twice as
long is worse. This assumption of Temkin's is not an intuition about a particular
comparison between two well-specified experiences. Rather it is a schema for
intuitions about an infinity of possible comparisons. I do not deny that it has a
certain plausibility as a universal schema, but I have less confidence in this sort of
intuition-schema than in particular intuitions.
This thought led me to wonder if we could do without the schema. Could I
identify some single intermediate experience somewhere between the two years of
torture and the immensely long life with a hangnail which would be both worse than
the two years of torture (because of being more prolonged) and better than the
lifelong hangnail? If such an experience, call it Q, could be identified, then A would
be better than Q, Q would be better than Y, and Y would be better than A, so we
would have a simpler example of intransitivity, based on particular well-specified
intuitions. But I have not been able to identify a Q. For Q to exist, we need a level
of pain which (a) is sufficiently bad so that a long stretch ofit can be worse than two
years of excruciating torture, and yet (b) is sufficiently not-bad so that that same long
stretch of it is still better than some very much longer period with a hangnail. It
seems that the floor put under the intensity-of-pain by (a) is higher than the ceiling
put on the intensity-of-pain by (b).
Now, the fact that I cannot come up with a simpler example than Temkin's
to prove his point may not seem like much of an argument against him. But these
thoughts led me to the further observation that if Temkin's conclusion is correct, then
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there must be a simpler example. Temkin's example involves a long chain of states,
but whenever we have a long chain that violates transitivity (which I shall call an ncycle), there must be some subset of three elements in the chain, not necessarily
contiguous, which violate transitivity also. (In fact, this is the only reason we are
justified in speaking of the n-cycle as violating transitivity, since transitivity is
defined in terms of how the relation behaves on three-element sets.) Consider a
chain l to N, where i+ I is always worse than i ( I [I i □ N- l ), but N is better than l.
(This is Temkin's example, renamed for convenience.) Now consider the relation
between 2 and N. If2 is better than N, then the set consisting of I, 2, and N violates
transitivity. (I is better than 2; 2 is better than N; but l is not better than N.) If, on
the other hand, 2 is not better then N, then we tum our attention to the reduced chain
from 2 to N (which incidentally is now known to violate transitivity) and repeat the
argument, in the reduced chain, by a<;king about the relation between 3 and N. If 3 is
better than N, then the set {2, 3, N} violates transitivity. (2 is better than 3, and 3 is
better than N, but 2 is not better than N.) If 3 is not better than N, we transfer our
attention to the chain from 3 to N, and we ask about the relation between 4 and N.
And so on. It is clear that we must eventually find a set of three elements that
violates transitivity. If the process we have been describing continues up to the point
where we find that N-2 is not better than N, then the set {N-2, N-1, N} violates
transitivity. QED. I should note that I have made one assumption beyond Temkin's,
which is that all pairs of the form i,N are comparable in terms of "better than".
(Either i is better than N, or it is not.) But that is not an assumption I would expect
Temkin to deny.
'TT1e upshot is that if Temkin's conclusion is correct, there must be a very
much simpler example to demonstrate it, an example involving only three states. If
we were confronted with any putative three-state example, then we could think about
the plausibility and robustness of just three well-specified intuitions, rather than the
intuition-schema that is Temkin's first assumption (and various other complexities
such as he discusses in his article). It seems reasonable to regard a conclusion so
counterintuitive as Temkin's as unproven until he has either offered the three-state
example that we know must exist, or at least explained why, even though it must
exist, we cannot specify it.

3.

OTHER EX NIH/LO ARGUMENTS

The one sort of ex nihilist position that I cannot understand at all is that of
someone like Jonathan Harrison, at least if we take what he says at face value.
Harrison's general view is that one should do [not do] an act if the consequences of
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its being done by everyone who is making a serious choice about whether to do it
21
would be good [bad].
He calls this view "cumulative-effect utilitarianism", but it
seems the same as what is usually referred to as "utilitarian generalization", so for
convenience I shall sometimes refer to Harrison as a "generalizer". At one point,
Harrison considers whether an act-utilitarian could justify the same behavior that
cumulative-effect utilitarianism requires, by an argument based on probability. On
its face, act-utilitarianism would sometimes require individual defection from a
generally useful practice. But Harrison imagines the act-utilitarian arguing that each
agent should do what it would be best that everyone do in order to avoid the risk that
his act might occur just at a margin where, given other people's behavior, his
defection would undermine the good to be achieved by general participation or bring
about the harm to be prevented by general avoidance.
Harrison attempts to answer this argument by saying that there is no risk.
He focuses on the proverbial case of piling straws on a camel's back. · Assuming
there are enough people standing around waiting to add a straw so that everyone's
doing so would break the camel's back, cumulative-effect utilitarianism calls for
general avoidance. But according to Harrison, any act-utilitarian in the group must
add his straw (ifhe has any positive reason to do so), because it is "quite untrue that
anyone's putting one single straw on the camel's back ever does the camel any
harm". 22 It does not matter how many other people are putting their straws on the
camel's back: "The camel's back is never sensitive to individual straws . . . . Those
who suppose that there must be [straws which individually do some harm] simply do
not grasp the fact that the effects of a number of repetitions of an action, which
individually do no harm, can do harm. "23 And more to the same effect.
But Harrison's "fact" is no such thing. Harrison is in the position of
someone who asserts all the premises of a sorites argument, and then denies the
conclusion, with no further comment. If no one puts a straw on the camel's back, the
beast is unharmed. Acccording to Harrison, no individual straw produces any effect.
(''There is a threshold such that stimuli of certain degrees of magnitude which fall
below it produce no effect. ")24 So, the first straw produces no effect. Therefore the
condition of the camel is exactly the same after the first straw is added as when there
were no straws. Similarly, the second straw produces no effect. Therefore the
condition of the camel is exactly the same after the second straw is added as after the
first, which means, by the transitivity of "exactly the same", that the condition of the
camel is exactly the same after the second straw is added as when there were no
straws. And so on, until the camel's back is broken, but the condition of the camel is
still exactly the same as when there were no straws.
The sorites is a remarkably durable paradox (perhaps because, as Crispin
Wright has suggested, it is really a number of paradoxes similar in form), 25 and there
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is no general agreement about how to dissolve it. But surely the one thing we cannot
do is just assert all the premises and deny the conclusion and say no more about it.
Even Michael Dummett, one of the few writers on sorites who does not attempt to
explain it away, at least offers to explain it by the assertion that the observational
predicates involved in the versions he discusses are incoherent. 26
Almost everyone who discusses sorites proposes to dissolve the paradox by
finding some fault or other in the induction premise - the premise that moves us
step-by-step along the chain - in Harrison's version, the premise that no single straw
has any effect. 27 And it seems obvious that the induction premise is where the fault
lies in Harrison's version of sorites. It is not true that no straw has any effect. It may
be that there is no straw that breaks the camel's back - that depends on how we
understand "broken" in this context. But it must be (logically) that some straw has
some effect, and indeed it is certain empirically, even if not logically, that many
(individual) straws do. At a microscopic level, any number of straws (individually)
increase the strain on the camel's bones and sinews; and any number of straws
(individually) change slightly the probabilities that the camel will be unable to stand
up under his burden or will stagger and collapse in mid-stride as a rock moves under
his foot.
The reader may still wonder how such tiny effects could matter to what an
agent ought to do. But we should remember, once we have blocked Harrison's
argument, that if the total harm from the whole chain of straw-additions is greater
than the total benefit from them, then there must be some individual straw-addition
where the marginal harm is greater than the marginal benefit. If this seems
implausible given the small size of the harms, we can increase its plausibility by
inquiring into the size of the benefits. If the benefit from each addition (or almost
every addition) is extremely small, then it is not so surprising that at some point even
a small marginal harm should outweigh the benefit. On the other hand, if the
benefits are not extremely small almost everywhere (that is to say, if a substantial
percentage of the straw-additions produce non-trivial benefits), and if it takes a lot of
straws to break the camel's back (as the "tiny effect" objection presupposes), then the
total benefit may well be such that it is best on balance, from a consequentialist
perspective, that the camel's back be broken. (This may sound odd, since we might
assume that the benefit of adding one's straw depends on ending up with an
ambulatory camel. But in fact that assumption would be inconsistent with another of
the generalizer's assumptions, usually left implicit, that the benefit is independent of
how many others add their straws.)
There is one point at which Harrison seems to recognize his overreaching.
In the middle of a passage where he repeatedly insists that no individual action has
any effect at all, he says just once that no individual action has any "appreciable"
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effect 28 -- which is, of course, a completely different claim. This new claim suggests
two further arguments against act-utilitarianism. One is the "tiny effect" objection
we have just answered. The other involves arguing, not for an objective actutilitarian prisoners' dilemma, but rather for what we might call a subjective actutilitarian prisoners' dilemma, where each agent's unequivocal subjective obligation
is to behave in such a way that the set of all agents produces sub-optimal
consequences. The argument in the camel case is clear: Even if some individual
actions must have some bad effects, and even some net bad effects, no individual
action ever has enough of a net bad effect to justify worrying about it. Hence every
agent is subjectively required to defect from the desirable general pattern, and the
pattern is not, cannot be, achieved.
There is an answer to this argument, which both Parfit and Ihave suggested
(although I hid it away in a footnote 29 and Parfit discusses only one special sort of
case, voting). 30 Let's do a simple but general example quickly and crudely. Suppose
there are a thousand people, and the participation of some large number of them is
needed to produce a benefit with value B. (We don't need to be precise about the
number, nor is it necessary that there should be a perfectly sharp threshold.) Each
individual can produce a benefit with value b* by defecting. This is the sort of case
in which the generalizer is likely to think that everyone should participate because
that is what it is best for everyone to do. This requires, of course, that B > 1,000 b*.
On the other hand, the generalizer argues that from the point of view of each
individual, the likelihood that his not participating will cause any significant loss in
the overall benefit is very small. So, subjective utilitarianism requires him to defect.
But if everyone follows this command of subjective act-utilitarianism, the result is
disastrous.
In response, the first and crucial point is this. Subjective act-utilitarianism
should not be understood as requiring the agent to maximize the likelihood that his
act will be objectively right, which might indeed mean that he should defect. Rather,
it should be understood as requiring him to maximize his act's expected utility. 31
Now, we cannot give a precise calculation for the expected value of participating
without definite assumptions about what other people are likely to do and about what
levels of participation secure how much of the total possible benefit B. But let us
assume crudely that it is equally likely that no one else participates, that one other
person participates, that two others participate, and so on right up to nine-hundred
ninety-nine others participating. (This assumption is in some respects quite
implausible, but the reader who follows through the argument with this assumption
will be in a position to see that more realistic assumptions will often strengthen the
subjective act-utilitarian case for participation; and that when they do not, it will
often be because other people's likely behavior and the value-achieved schedule are
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such as to make the generalizer's recommendation of participation unrealistically
optimistic about others' behavior.) On our crude assumption, the expected value E of
participating is Li=1 1,ooo 1/1000 bi , where bi is the marginal benefit secured by
being the ith person participating. So, E = 1/1,000 Li=l i,ooo bi. But L=i 1• 000 bi
B (the total benefit from universal participation), by an argument like the
argument for the summation principle (S) at the beginning of the preceding section.
So E
1/1,000 B. But we saw above that if the generalizer's prescription is to be
plausible at all, it must be that B > 1,000 b*, where b* is the benefit from each
individual act of defection. It follows that E
1/1,000 B > b*, so the expected
value of participating (E) is greater than the benefit from defection (b*), and
subjective act-utilitarianism requires participation.
There is a puzzle about the stability of this conclusion in a society of actutilitarians. If everyone is an act-utilitarian, and if it is understood that for reasons
such as I have just indicated subjective act-utilitarianism requires participation, then
the probable level of participation is very high. And if that is the case, then the
expected value from one individual's participation may decline below b*. So
subjective act-utilitarianism now requires defection. And unfortunately, if everyone
is an act-utilitarian who understands that subjective act-utilitarianism requires
defection, then the defection rate will be high, the expected value of participation
may again be very low, and subjective act-utilitarianism may still require defection.
So this is a stable situation. It may seem that subjective act-utilitarianism fails after
all. But that conclusion also is too quick. In Utilitarianism and Co-operation I
pointed out that in cases such as the ones we are discussing there will standardly be
at least two general patterns of behavior, in each of which act-utilitarianism is
universally satisfied. 32 One or more will be sup-optimal, but one will be the optimal
general pattern of behavior. It would appear that this optimal pattern of behavior, all
of which is fully act-utilitarian, will also be a pattern to which an appropriately
formulated subjective act-utilitarian prescription can stably gravitate. It is not my
primary goal to defend subjective act-utilitarianism (or objective act-utilitarianism),
but we see that even the question of whether there can be a subjective act-utilitarian
prisoners' dilemma is too complicated to afford an easy rehabilitation of Harrison's
position. Possibly there are some subjective act-utilitarian prisoners' dilemmas. But
it does not seem probable to me that they are so common as to make cumulativeeffect utilitarianism generally preferable.

=
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

The reader may wonder why, ifmy object is not to defend act-utilitarianism, I am
so insistent that the ex nihilo claim is mistaken. One reason, as we have seen, is to
preserve the transitivity of "better than". The other reason is that it is important to
me that there cannot be cases where the achievement of optimal results requires nonact-utilitarian behavior (in other words, objective act-utilitarian prisoners' dilemmas).
This is not because if act utilitarian prisoners' dilemmas are impossible, then
universal satisfaction of act-utilitarianism always guarantees optimal results - which
sadly is not true. 33 But at least if act-utilitarian prisoners' dHemmas are impossible,
then there is room for some other theory (like co-operative utilitarianism)34 to
guarantee optimal results by the group of agents who follow it, without creating the
tension in practical reasoning which would be generated if those optimal results
required some agent to behave in a way which produced less than the best possible
results individually.

Donald H. Regan
Department ofPhilosophy
University ofMichigan
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